

Europese Unie Europees Fonds voor Regionale Ontwikkeling










Agent-based Modelling and Simulation of Airport Terminal

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Projects


Introduction Methodology Case study Discussion & Conclusion



- Systemic agent-based modelling and analysis of passenger discretionary activities in airport terminals (CTG)
- Agent-based modelling and simulation of airport terminal operations under COVID-19-related restrictions
- Surrogate modeling of agent-based airport terminal operations
- An improved Tabu Search for optimising the configuration of an agent-based simulation model of a novel security checkpoint
- Remote luggage check-in (on goinig)




Call-to-Gate at airports



RTHA terminal overview







Stakeholders/Processes



Check-in

• Airline and/or ground handling

Security

• Airport and/or security provider

Retail

• Airport

Food & Beverage


• Airport

Lounge area

• Airport

Boarding

• Airline and/or ground handling






Check-in and baggage drop KPI's and measures








Security check KPI's and control measures




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Retail KPI's and control measures








Boarding KPI's and control measures








An airport terminal can be well represented by an agent-based model





- ABM: bottom-up modelling approach: •
 - Agents are autonomous entities.
 - They are placed in the **environment** with an initial set of rules
 - -> behaviour & interactions




- + Modular (different airports, measures)
- + Realism (human cognitive behaviour, local interactions -> global emergence)
- + Key Performance Indicators
- + Modular -> Hypothesis testing

AATOM Full Architecture




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Strategic Layer

Simulation & Graphs in AATOM








Graphs



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Experiments

- Experiment 1: effects of time at which passengers are called to the gate For experiment 1, 10 call-to-gate strategies are used in which the time ranges from 30 minutes to 120 minutes with steps of 10 minutes. The call-to-gate below 30 minutes was not considered because the boarding process starts 30 minutes before flight departure.
- Experiment 2: effects of security lane allocation. It indicates how many security lanes are open per time interval. The choices for the strategies are based on the average number of passengers expected to arrive in each time interval. Between 14:30-15:30, more passengers are expected to arrive compared to what a single security lane is able to handle without accumulating queue time. A fixed call-to-gate strategy of 45 minutes is used for this experiment.
- Experiment 3: combined effect of call-to-gate and security lane allocation Experiment 3 uses the call-to-gate strategies from experiment 1, and the security lane allocation strategies from experiment 2. Thus, for each explored call-to-gate time, four security checkpoint lane allocation strategies are explored.

Security lane allocation strategies, indicating how many security lanes are open per time interval.

Strategy	14:00-	14:30-	15:00-	15:30-	16:00-	16:30-
	14:30	15:00	15:30	16:00	16:30	17:00
1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	2	1	1	1	1
3	1	μ	2	1	1	1
4	1	2	2	1	1	1


Introduction

Methodology


Discussion &

Conclusion

Pax type vs Expenditure



Goals completed vs CtG



Strategy	Average security checkpoint queue time (seconds)	Total expenditure (€)	Security checkpoint costs (€)
1	337.6	428.7	360
2	149.1	453.5	420
3	97.7	466.3	420
4	54.8	469.6	480

Conclusion

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- Expenditure can significantly increase if passengers are called to the gate later. Calling passengers later to the gate increases dwelling time of passengers, which causes passengers to complete more discretionary goals. Airport enthusiast passengers are particularly important for generating expenditure.
- Reducing average queue time at security checkpoint can also significantly increase expenditure, but the magnitude depends on the strategy. If the strategy reduces dwelling time of airport enthusiast passengers, less goals involving discretionary activities are completed. If this is not the case, keeping more lanes open does not necessary improve expenditure generation.

Conclusion



Call-to-gate strategies influence the effectiveness of security lane allocation strategies with respect to total generated expenditure. Call-to-gate strategies which result in little free time for passengers can benefit from additional security resources at time intervals at which early passengers arrive, since it can aid early passengers to complete some discretionary goals. However, call-to-gate strategies which result in more free time for passengers can benefit from additional security resources at time intervals when the majority of passengers arrive, since more passengers can complete discretionary goals.

Thanks to all who collaborated (and collaborated) on this project:

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